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Yes, But

Last week was occupied by warnings. Syria is now on its best behavior - which is not saying much - but the Assad regime was not the Bush Administration's real target. Even an invasion of fragile Syria takes preparation, and even marines cannot roll from Baghdad to Damascus on a dime.

But Bush is working with a long horizon, and the marines will be ready again soon enough. It is not logistics that will prevent Bush from confronting the next rogue nation, but public opinion and its proxy, Congressional authorization. Which is why the Administration's true target last week was actually the "Yes, but" crowd.

Poor Tom Friedman. When he wrote his influential column "Yes, but what?" three weeks after 9/11, he could not have imagined that it would one day be used to justify preemptive attacks on sovereign nations. That day, Friedman's condemnation extended simply to those who believed that "Yes, [9/11] was terrible, but somehow America deserved it or is responsible for the anger behind it."

An injunction against force was implicit in that "Yes, but." America was counseled to understand its enemies, rather than destroy them.

Friedman rejected extending grace to Al Qaeda. Its record was too heinous, and America's, on the balance, too good, to accept such moral equivalence. The burden, he said, was now on Al Qaeda to justify its continued existence, not on America to justify bringing Al Qaeda to justice.

If the "Yes, but" crowd lost the debate after 9/11, it nevertheless remains a force. Most of us - like Friedman himself - are actually in the "Yes, but" crowd. We may have seen 9/11 in black and white, but most of the time we see shades of grey, and the nuances we see constrain us from acting with unilateral righteousness.

Under Clinton, America's policy towards rogue nations was in fact "Yes, but." Yes, Iraq kicked out inspectors, but invasion must be approved by the UN. Yes, Syria is a dictatorship, but we cannot force freedom on others. Yes, Iran sponsors terrorism, but who are we to lecture after our support of the Shah? Yes, North Korea starves its people and develops nuclear weapons, but we have no moral right to reject engagement and choose force.

Bush rejected these arguments in Iraq, and is now striving to end their political force once and for all. Syria has chemical weapons, he said, so yes, it is dangerous. Syria supports terrorism, so yes, it is a rogue state. Syria is a dictatorship that controls Lebanon, so yes, it violates fundamental political rights. Syria has aided Saddam Hussein, so yes, it is an enemy.

There were no qualifications, and there were no reservations. This was not a "Yes, but." This was "Yes, period."

The United States will not invade Syria. But Bush does intend to keep the pressure on regimes that support terrorists and develop weapons of mass destruction. To maintain this pressure, he must wield the threat of force.

And for the threat of force to be credible, Bush needs only the support of the American public. The international community has shown itself too weak - both militarily and politically - to constrain America. Only the American public limits Bush now.

Just one month ago, there were two currents in American discourse opposing military actions: the moral argument of "Yes, but," and the practical fears of the Vietnam generation. But there was no quagmire in Iraq, and the war cost just $20 billion to wage. The practical arguments against war have been swept aside by a US military that is hugely superior to its enemies.

So now there is just "Yes, but" - which means, of course, that there is just "but." One word, one thin word, stands between the Administration and the freedom it seeks to confront rogue regimes worldwide.

The Bush Administration's long-term goal is to rid the world of rogue regimes. But to do that, it must first end the power of the word "but" over the American public. That is the new target, not Syria.